patches/openwrt: remove upstreamed openssl 1.1.1t update patch

patches/openwrt/to-upstream/0057-openssl-bump-to-1.1.1t.patch

-From 1e2bcf83be46fde2e805ebe1e97cac08a8ee72f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: John Audia <therealgraysky@proton.me>
-Date: Tue, 7 Feb 2023 14:56:52 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] openssl: bump to 1.1.1t
-
-Changes between 1.1.1s and 1.1.1t [7 Feb 2023]
-
-  *) Fixed X.400 address type confusion in X.509 GeneralName.
-
-     There is a type confusion vulnerability relating to X.400 address processing
-     inside an X.509 GeneralName. X.400 addresses were parsed as an ASN1_STRING
-     but subsequently interpreted by GENERAL_NAME_cmp as an ASN1_TYPE. This
-     vulnerability may allow an attacker who can provide a certificate chain and
-     CRL (neither of which need have a valid signature) to pass arbitrary
-     pointers to a memcmp call, creating a possible read primitive, subject to
-     some constraints. Refer to the advisory for more information. Thanks to
-     David Benjamin for discovering this issue. (CVE-2023-0286)
-
-     This issue has been fixed by changing the public header file definition of
-     GENERAL_NAME so that x400Address reflects the implementation. It was not
-     possible for any existing application to successfully use the existing
-     definition; however, if any application references the x400Address field
-     (e.g. in dead code), note that the type of this field has changed. There is
-     no ABI change.
-     [Hugo Landau]
-
-  *) Fixed Use-after-free following BIO_new_NDEF.
-
-     The public API function BIO_new_NDEF is a helper function used for
-     streaming ASN.1 data via a BIO. It is primarily used internally to OpenSSL
-     to support the SMIME, CMS and PKCS7 streaming capabilities, but may also
-     be called directly by end user applications.
-
-     The function receives a BIO from the caller, prepends a new BIO_f_asn1
-     filter BIO onto the front of it to form a BIO chain, and then returns
-     the new head of the BIO chain to the caller. Under certain conditions,
-     for example if a CMS recipient public key is invalid, the new filter BIO
-     is freed and the function returns a NULL result indicating a failure.
-     However, in this case, the BIO chain is not properly cleaned up and the
-     BIO passed by the caller still retains internal pointers to the previously
-     freed filter BIO. If the caller then goes on to call BIO_pop() on the BIO
-     then a use-after-free will occur. This will most likely result in a crash.
-     (CVE-2023-0215)
-     [Viktor Dukhovni, Matt Caswell]
-
-  *) Fixed Double free after calling PEM_read_bio_ex.
-
-     The function PEM_read_bio_ex() reads a PEM file from a BIO and parses and
-     decodes the "name" (e.g. "CERTIFICATE"), any header data and the payload
-     data. If the function succeeds then the "name_out", "header" and "data"
-     arguments are populated with pointers to buffers containing the relevant
-     decoded data. The caller is responsible for freeing those buffers. It is
-     possible to construct a PEM file that results in 0 bytes of payload data.
-     In this case PEM_read_bio_ex() will return a failure code but will populate
-     the header argument with a pointer to a buffer that has already been freed.
-     If the caller also frees this buffer then a double free will occur. This
-     will most likely lead to a crash.
-
-     The functions PEM_read_bio() and PEM_read() are simple wrappers around
-     PEM_read_bio_ex() and therefore these functions are also directly affected.
-
-     These functions are also called indirectly by a number of other OpenSSL
-     functions including PEM_X509_INFO_read_bio_ex() and
-     SSL_CTX_use_serverinfo_file() which are also vulnerable. Some OpenSSL
-     internal uses of these functions are not vulnerable because the caller does
-     not free the header argument if PEM_read_bio_ex() returns a failure code.
-     (CVE-2022-4450)
-     [Kurt Roeckx, Matt Caswell]
-
-  *) Fixed Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption.
-
-     A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption
-     implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across
-     a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful
-     decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number
-     of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding
-     modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
-     (CVE-2022-4304)
-     [Dmitry Belyavsky, Hubert Kario]
-
-Signed-off-by: John Audia <therealgraysky@proton.me>
----
- package/libs/openssl/Makefile | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/package/libs/openssl/Makefile b/package/libs/openssl/Makefile
-index 04b00e2bf5..aa3dbb7877 100644
---- a/package/libs/openssl/Makefile
-+++ b/package/libs/openssl/Makefile
-@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ include $(TOPDIR)/rules.mk
- 
- PKG_NAME:=openssl
- PKG_BASE:=1.1.1
--PKG_BUGFIX:=s
-+PKG_BUGFIX:=t
- PKG_VERSION:=$(PKG_BASE)$(PKG_BUGFIX)
- PKG_RELEASE:=1
- PKG_USE_MIPS16:=0
-@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ PKG_SOURCE_URL:= \
- 	ftp://ftp.pca.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/openssl/source/ \
- 	ftp://ftp.pca.dfn.de/pub/tools/net/openssl/source/old/$(PKG_BASE)/
- 
--PKG_HASH:=c5ac01e760ee6ff0dab61d6b2bbd30146724d063eb322180c6f18a6f74e4b6aa
-+PKG_HASH:=8dee9b24bdb1dcbf0c3d1e9b02fb8f6bf22165e807f45adeb7c9677536859d3b
- 
- PKG_LICENSE:=OpenSSL
- PKG_LICENSE_FILES:=LICENSE
--- 
-2.34.1
-